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Reasoned Compassion in a More Humane Forum:
A Proposal to Use ADR to
Resolve Medical Treatment Decisions
I. INTRODUCTION
A 1990 Gallup pol asked respondents: "If you, yourself, were
on life-support systems and there was no hope of recovering, would you
like to remain on the life-support system or would you like treatment
withheld so that you could end your life?" Eighty-four percent said they
would want treatment withheld. Only nine percent of respondents said
they would want to be left on the life-support system. Adults "strongly
feel that death is preferable to living in permanent pain, or on life-support
systems."2 Even though seventy-five percent of Americans support the
concept of a living will,3 only about twenty percent have actually written
one.' And for those who have executed a living will, there is no
automatic guarantee that the courts will honor its provisions.' "[Tihe goal
of private, personal decision making about the manner and timing of one's
death often exists more as a matter of abstract legal principle than as a
practical reality."'
The issue is even more complex when the life in question is that
of an incompetent person, with either an inadequate or nonexistent
expression of prior wishes. The resulting conflict between the
technological ability to sustain life and the possibility of a valid, but
unsubstantiated, desire not to be maintained by extraordinary measures is a
matter of increasing deliberation within the hospitals, nursing homes, and
1. MNRROR OF AMERICA: FEAR OF DYING, GALLUP POLL (Gallup Poll News Sere.,
Jan 6, 1990) [hereinafter GALLUP POLL]. The Gallup Poll has conducted surveys of the
American public on issues of life and death since 1947. The results published were based on
telephone interviews with a random-selected national sample of 1018 adults, 18 and older,
conducted November 15-16, 1990. The Gallup Poll states with 95% confidence that the
error attributable to sampling and other random effects could be plus or minus 3 percentage
points.
2. Id. at 3.
3. "A living will is a document which governs the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment from an individual in the event of an incurable or irreversible condition
that will cause death within a relatively short time, and when such person is no longer able to
make decisions regarding his or her medical treatment. Living wills are permitted by statute
in most states." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990).
4. GALLUP POLL, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Court Decisions: Evans v. Bellevue Hospital, 198 N.Y. W. 11 (July, 28, 1987).
6. iUnda C. Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood Revisited: A New Framework for
Substitute Decision-Making for the Incompetent, Incurably Ill Adult, 57 G~o. WASH. L. REV.
801, 805 (1988).
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courtrooms of this country.'
The decision to withdraw life-support systems in order to allow
a critically ill patient to die is a deeply personal one, yet the
concern over the implication of such actions necessarily draws
outsiders into what is already a painful decision for the patient's
family. The legal community theorizes about whether such
actions are within the confines of the law; the medical
community ponders the ethics of terminating a life; and the
religious community debates the implications of a person's
afterlife.8
Resulting legal-medical-religious colloquies theorize whether
mere biological existence should be protected, or whether a finer
distinction can be drawn between biological existence and what is uniquely
human and therefore of higher value. Attempts to resolve this intensely
personal and private dilemma range from the blatantly subjective to the
ostensibly objective, with decision making authority generally resting
within the medical and legal communities.9 All too often, families are
relegated to advisor or consultant roles, saddled with the burden of
proving with "clear and convincing evidence""0 a patient's wish for the
cessation of medical treatment."
Today, an individual's ability to direct future medical decisions in
the event of her incompetency, and her family's or loved ones' power to
make those decisions for her, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence, varies widely from state to state. If a car crashed on the George
Washington Bridge, which spans the river separating New Jersey and New
York, and a passenger were critically injured and rendered incompetent,
her self-determination and her family's or loved ones' authority to control
7. "[IThe radical advances in life sustaining equipment and procedures developed by the
medical profession in the last twenty years have taxed the common law process in ways that
it has never been tested before." Sol Wachtler, Life and Death Decisions: The Patient's
Choice, 205 N.Y. LJ. 39 (Jan. 23, 1991).
8. Michele Yuen, Note, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate
Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. Ruv. 581, 582 (1992).
9. "In the tradition of individual autonomy, the choice has ostensibly been left to each
individual patient but has usually, in fact, been made by doctors applying 'medical
standards.' Physicians have assumed the responsibility, leaving patients and their surrogates
to go through courts to assert their right to decide.* George J. Alexander, Death by
Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 67, 67 (1988).
10. Cruzanv. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
11. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 390 (1988).
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her fate would be affected by which state provided the ambulance.' "It
seems grossly unfair that a person's rights should grow and shrink
according to the fortuity of the state in which she may happen to become
ill. 13
Case law is replete with opinions that describe the struggles of
families and friends to compel the court to terminate or not to terminate an
incompetent person's life-sustaining medical treatment.1' This process,
which subjects families and loved ones to lengthy and complex judicial
procedures, tremendous financial cost, emotional expenditure, and public
exposure and scrutiny' - during the most intimate and private of
decisions - must be examined in a new light.
This Comment suggests that courts and legislatures review the
standards of proof and the mechanisms for cessation of medical treatment
decisions, recognizing that evidential mandates of objectivity and "clear
and convincing evidence" often place too great a burden of proof on
family members - arguably the most informed decision makers in these
personal and private situations.16 This Comment also proposes that
family members, other close friends, or the designated proxy have a
rebuttable presumption in favor of their decisions,17  with parties
12. Yuen, supra note 8, at 617 (citing Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990,
at 62, 68).
13. Id. at 617.
14. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Gray by Gray v. Romero, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D. R.I.
1988); In re Lawrence, 579 N.E. 2d 32 (Ind. 1991); Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263
(Mass. 1992); In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. App. Mar. 5, 1991),
reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Mar. 26, 1991), cause ordered transferred to Mo. S. Ct. (Apr.
15, 1991), appeal dismissed No. 73677 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(NJ. 1976).
15. Mr. and Mrs. William Lawrance, parents of Sue Ann Lawrance, a brain-damaged
42 year-old woman, were thrown into the middle of a "right-to-die" controversy when they
requested permission to cease Ms. Lawrance's feedings in 1991. She had been disabled from
a brain tumor since 1958, and had been in a persistent vegetative state, with no hope of
recovery, since 1987 when she fell out of a wheelchair. A Christian Advocacy group for the
disabled intervened and secured a court-appointed guardian for Ms. Lawrance and pursued an
appeal. The case was to be heard by the state Supreme Court, but Ms. Lawrance died before
the court could rule. Her parents and brother were emotionally drained from the experience
of making the decision to request termination, as well as the battle to justify their decision.
Despite Ms. Lawrance's death, her family asked the high court to examine the case, saying a
court decision could prevent other families from having to fight the same battles they had to
face. "I would hope it would allow them some freedom of choice to be able to direct their
own care," said Mrs. Lawrance. Right-to-Die Figure Sue Ann Lawrance, CHI. TRIB., July
21, 1991, at Zone C, 6. See generally supra note 14.
16. Rhoden, supra note 11, at 438.
17. Id. at 437.
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representing medical or state interests bearing the burden of proof that a
decision is not in the patient's best interests, - or that the family member
is operating with a selfish motive." Furthermore, thiComment contends
that alternative dispute mechanisms should create the forum for
challenging family, close friend, or designated proxy decisions regarding
cessation of medical treatment.' A mediation mechanism, followed by
mandatory non-binding arbitration prior to any adjudication would
rehumanize these situations and provide ample opportunity to examine and
resolve conflicting interests. Lengthy and expensive adversarial courtroom
dramas would thus be relegated to only the most difficult cases.
Part II of this Comment distinguishes between competent,
incapacitated, and persistent vegetative patients and describes the changing
concepts of death that have resulted from advances in medical technology.
Part III examines the historical concept of the family and proposes a
substantial broadening of this concept to reflect the current reality of the
American family unit. Part IV presents the predominant decisional
frameworks currently employed in making cessation of treatment
decisions. Part IV also discusses the wisdom of continued judicial and
medical support of the presumption that life-sustaining treatment is
preferable, regardless of an individual's physical condition. Part V
highlights several state approaches to the resolution of cessation of
treatment decisions, emphasizing the New York approach. Finally, Part
VI proposes a mediation-based, family-centered decision making model.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONS AS INCOMPETENT OR INCAPACITATED
AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF DEATH
A. Competency, Incompetency, and Persistent Vegetative
States
1. Competency
Originating from two Greek terms meaning "self" and "rule" or
"law" autonomy is the "quality or state of being self-governing . . .
18. "The physician should be required to prove the unreasonableness of the family
choice." Id. at 441.
19. General fears include that the family member is anxious to rid the family of the
pain of watching a loved one die, or that a family member is interested in conserving possible
financial inheritances by eliminating prolonged medical expenses.
20. See Yuen, supra note 8; see also Fentiman, supra note 6.
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[possessing] self directing freedom and especially moral independence."2'
"[1In moral philosophy personal autonomy has come to refer to . . .
personal rule of the self by adequate understanding while remaining free
from controlling interferences by others and from personal limitations that
prevent choice." '
An autonomous person is considered to be competent and to the
extent allowed by law, in charge of his own destiny. Autonomy regarding
medical treatment decisions has been supported by the common law for
over a century and was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford in 1891.2'
[No] right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the
poss~ssion and control of his own person, free from all
restraint, or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law. 24
Justice Cardozo, while sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, further
clarified the issue when he wrote: "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. "2'
In sum, whether supported by federal constitutional arguments of
due process,' liberty, ' or the right to privacy;2' state constitutional
21. WEBSTEr's NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcrIoNARY 118 (1990).
22. James *opp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Siren's Lure of Invented Consent: A Critique
of Autonomy-based Surrogate Decisionmaking for Legally-Incapacitated Older Persons, 42
HASTINGS L. J. 779, 798 nn.106, 108 (1991) (citing R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 8 (1986)).
23. Martha N. Mullins, Note, The Need for Guidance in Decisionmaling for Terminally
Ill Incompetents: Is the Ohio Legislature in a "Persistent Vegetative State?", 17 OHIO N. U.
L. REV. 827, 829 (1991).
24. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
25. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
26. "The majority opinion in Cruzan left open the question of whether the due process
clauses establish a right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. Chief Justice Rehnquist only
assumed that such a right existed for the purpose of deciding the case." JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTntrrloNAL LAW 814 (4th ed. 1991).
27. "Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We
believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest." Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279 n.7 (1990).
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guarantees of privacy;' or common law rights of informed consent,30
28. Prior to Cruzan, numerous state courts [had] reasoned from Supreme
Court decisions that the right to privacy is broad enough to grant an
individual the right to chart his or her own medical treatment plan. We
agree with oui sister states. The right to refuse medical treatment is a
personal right sufficiently "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" to fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy contemplated by the Supreme Court.
In re Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987) partially overruled by Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health; see, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Supp. 1984); Severns
v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d
160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affld 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass.
1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. f976), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Farrell, 514 A.2d 1342 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986);
Leach v. Akron General Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Misc. 1980); In re of Welfare
of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
29. There are at least 10 states that have privacy provisions in their state constitutions,
but only a few have used these provisions to decide right-to-die cases. Thomas C. Marks &
Rebecca C. Morgan, The Right of the Dying to Refuse Life Prolonging Medical Procedures:
The Evolving Imporance of State Constitutions, 18 OHIo N. U. L. REV. 467, 497 (1992). A
Florida Attorney General opinion indicated that § 23, Art. I, State Const. had been construed
by Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So.2d 368 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1986) as creating a
constitutional right to privacy that included the right to withdraw nutrition and hydration. 90-
98 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 300 (1990). The state of Arizona was even more explicit:
Unlike the federal constitution, the Arizona Constitution expressly
provides for a right to privacy. Article 2 of the Arizona Constitution
provides: § 8. Right to privacy Section 8. No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law. Although Arizona Constitution article 2, § 8 has been invoked
most often in a Fourth Amendment context, we see no reason not to
interpret "privacy" or "private affairs" as encompassing an individual's
right to refuse medical treatment. An individual's right to chart his or
her own plan of medical treatment deserves as much, if not more,
constitutionally-protected privacy than does an individual's home or
automobile.
In re Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 682.
30. Protection of this common-law right to be free from nonconsensual
bodily invasions is at the heart of what is known today as the doctrine
of informed consent. Under this doctrine, the patient must have the
capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made
voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient must have a clear
understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment
alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full understanding of the
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and self-determination, 3 a competent person has the power to determine
the care of her person, and by carefully utilizing this power, she can guide
her treatment even after she becomes incompetent. All too often,
however, this power lies unused.
2. Incompetency and the Persistent Vegetative State
A person unable to make personal medical treatment decisions is
generally considered to be either incompetent or incapacitated. It is
important to distinguish individuals once competent from those never
competent, because the former presumably had opportunities to
communicate in writing, execute relevant legal documents, such as living
WillsP or advance directives,' or express orally to other people their
wishes in the event of incapacitating illness.- Those individuals who
have never been competent can only have their personal 'wishes'
subjectively determined for them by family members, medical staff, state
human services representatives, or the courts.
This Comment is concerned primarily with the category of
nature of the disease and the prognosis... . We hold that the doctrine
of informed consent - a doctrine borne of the common-law right to be
free from nonconsensual physical invasions - permits an individual to
refuse medical treatment.
In re Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683.
31. Other courts also have held that the right to refuse medical treatment is both a
constitutional right and a common-law right. See, e.g., Foody, 482 A.2d at 717-18; Brophy,
497 N.E.2d at 633; Farrell, 514 A.2d at 1344; Colyer, 660 P.2d at 741-43; cf. In re
Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683; In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1984)
(recognizing constitutional and common-law rights but premising court holding on
constitutional and statutory rights); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985) (recognizing
constitutional right but limiting court holding to application of common-law right); In re
Storar, 420 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1981) (diseussing that whether right to refuse medical treatment
is guaranteed by the Constitution is a "disputed question" and premising holding on
.common-law principles').
32. For a definition of Living Will, see supra note 3.
33. 'An advance directive is an 'affirmative directive' to medical personnel or other
decision-makers specifying certain wishes of a competent person regarding medical treatment,
which that person executes in anticipation of future incompetency." Mullins, supra note 23,
at 836 n.62 (citing Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Tenninally Ill:
The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 Na. L. RnV. 779, 786-87 (1984)).
34. Express documents such as living wills or advance directives that are executed
according to a state's statutory requirements are generally accepted by the courts as
dispositive evidence of a person's choice. These documents can be challenged, however, by
medical, state, or family representatives on the issue of competency at the time of execution.
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incompetent patients who are permanently unconscious.' "Most of what
makes someone a distinctive individual is lost when the person is
unconscious, especially if he or she will always remain so.'
Permanent unconsciousness is also known as a persistent
vegetative state (PVS), the neurological condition that occurs post-coma
when the autonomic nervous system continues to function after the
cognitive functioning of the mind has ceased." A persistent vegetative
state is a condition in which the patient:
(a) shows no evidence of verbal or non-verbal communication;
(b) demonstrates no purposeful movement or motor ability; (c)
is unable to interact purposely with stimulation provided by his
environment; (d) is unable to provide for his own basic needs;
(e) demonstrates all of the above for longer than three
months. 38
Recurring characteristics of the PVS patient include a loss of participation,
observation, and interaction with their environments, and cessation of all
voluntary movement and recognizable communication skills. There is
generally no capacity for cognitive or sapient functioning.39
Jane Doe, a thirty-three year old woman who has been pro-
foundly mentally retarded since infancy,41 exhibits characteristics typical
35. This category includes formerly competent individuals, however, this Comment
concerns only those formerly competent individuals who did not previously express their
desires. These individuals and those never competent are often treated similarly with respect
to judicial involvement in the resolution of their treatment decisions. Their families also
experience similar frustrations in attempting to carry out what they feel is the best choice of
treatment or non-treatment.
36. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAININO
TREATMENT 123 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO].
37. Lawrence K. Altman, When the Mind Dies But the Brain Lives On, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1987, at C3.
38. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E. 2d 626, 628, n.4 (Mass.
1986) (citing DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 36, at 174-175)). These facts are consistent
with the definition of persistent vegetative state used by the President's Commission. Id.
39. DECIDING To FOREGO, supra note 36, at 174-175.
40. Jane Doe is a pseudonym.
41. Ms. Doe's mother discovered her impairments in early infancy. Brief for
Appellee/Guardian of the Ward at 5, Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992)
(No. 5637).
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of permanently unconscious patients. She suffers from a genetic
disorder& that has progressively destroyed her central nervous system,0
and she also suffers from severe brain atrophy, cortical blindness, and
cortical deafness.' Ms. Doe's "limbs are rigidly flexed, her joints
contracted, her muscles atrophied and her bones extremely brittle. Ms.
Doe breathes through a permanent tracheostomy necessitated by the
tendency of her tongue to swell and block her airway. " ' Ms. Doe is
mute. She does not respond to any sounds or to touch. She is unable to
see, hear, smell, smile, cry, chew, or swallow." She displays no
voluntary action or behavior.41
"The patient in a permanent vegetative coma has no hope of
recovery and merely lies, trapped in a technological limbo, awaiting the
inevitable. As a matter of established fact, such a patient has no health
and, in the true sense, no life for the state to protect."48
B. Conceptions of Death
Not long ago the realms of life and death were delineated by a
bright line. Now this line is blurred by wondrous advances in
medical technology - advances that until recent years were
only ideas conceivable by such science-fiction visionaries as
Jules Verne and H.G. Wells. Medical technology has
effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation
where death commences while life, in some form, continues.49
At the turn of the century, no one was confused about a
determination of death. If a person's heart stopped beating or her lungs
42. Ms. Doe suffers from Canavan's disease. The "salient clinical features [of
Canavan's disease] are onset in early infancy, atonia of the neck muscles, hyperextension of
the legs and flexion of [the] arms, blindness, severe mental defects and [megalocephaly]."
Doe, 583 N.E. 2d at 1266, nn.6-7. Ms. Doe was diagnosed as suffering from Canavan's
Disease in 1988 by laboratory tests that were unavailable before 1986. Victims of this
disease rarely live past the age of 10 and usually die from some form of infection. There is
no possibility that the disease can be arrested or reversed. Appellee/Guardian's Brief at 8,
n.1, Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992) (No. 5637).
43. Doe, 583 N.E. 2d at 1266, n.7.
44. Appellee/Guardian's Brief at 9, Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992) (no. 5637).
45. Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1267.
46. Appellee/Guardian's Brief at 9, Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992) (no. 5367).
47. Doe, 583 N.E. 2d at 1267.
48. In re Eichner, 73 A.D. 2d 431, 465 (N.Y. 1980).
49. In re Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674, 674 (Ariz. 1987).
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stopped inflating, the body's last bit of air soon escaped in a final sigh -
the body got cold -- the limbs got stiff - the person was dead.' Only
recently has modem technology repelled some of death's traditional
indicators. "One can see the effect of new medications and processes in
the changes in patterns of death. Contrasting the present with the turn of
the century, one notes that communicable diseases have greatly declined as
a cause of death while degenerative diseases have become more
prominent."s The dying are older, more often hospitalized, and more
likely to suffer for an extended period from the cause of their death than
was previously true.' Gone are the days when we pass away gently into
the "night," surrounded by friends and loved ones, comforted in our
homes. In 1949, half of all deaths occurred in hospitals, and that
percentage has increased about ten percent per decade.'
Due to advances in medical care, it is possible in some
circumstances to sustain the body's biological functions for
extended periods of time while the patient has no sense of pain
or pleasure, fear or joy, love or hate, understanding or
appreciation, taste or touch or smell or any other aspect of
life's experience, with no realistic possibility of sentient life.'
Definitions of death are changing. Where once "cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions"' would suffice, definitions
increasingly include reference to functions of the brain or brain stem.'
Studies reveal a wide range of attitudes about death, from wanting to hold
onto life irrespective of pain and discomfort to wanting death to come
quickly once an incurable illness is diagnosed.' "As more individuals
assert their right to refuse medical treatment, more frequently do the
disciplines of medicine, law, philosophy, technology, and religion collide.
This interdisciplinary interplay raises many questions to which no single
50. Death is defined as "the cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions
and signs." BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 400 (6th ed. 1990).
51. Alexander, supra note 9, at 68.
52. Id. at 5, 17, 18 (citing DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 36).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. "An individual that has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory function, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem, is dead." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (6th ed. 1990).
56. Id.
57. Alexander, supra note 9, at 70 (citing DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 36, at 21-
22).
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person or profession has all the answers."'
III. THE FAMILY UNrr AND ITS SuPERIORITY AS
DECISION MAKER
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and
relieve suffering. Where the performance of one duty confficts
with the other, the choice of the patient, or his family or legal
representative if the patient is incompetent to act in his own
behalf, should prevail.'
The meaning of the term "family" depends on the field of law in
which the word is used, the purpose of its use, and the facts and
circumstances of each case.' Its most common meaning refers generally
to a group of related persons, especially parents and their children, and
immediate kindred." The term "family" connotes "some relationship,
blood or otherwise."'
The Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R.' reasoned that the legal
concept of family begins with the presumption that "natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.""
Common law proffers authority for parents to act on behalf of their
children and authority for spouses, in certain, cases to act on behalf of
their marital partners." Bonds of affection, intimacy, and trust,
however, develop between individuals beyond these narrow categories.
The American family unit of the late twentieth century is greater
than the sum of traditional family members. Adults form lifelong
friendships stronger than those with siblings; same-sex couples live
together as life-partners; heterosexual couples choose to commit yet never
marry; extended "families" develop as intergenerational units among
related and unrelated individuals; people share living space for economic
58. In re Rasmussen, 741 P. 2d 674, 679 (Ariz. 1987).
59. Id. at 684.
60. LeRoux v. Edmundson, 148 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Minn. 1967), cited in BLACK'S,
supra note 3, at 604.
61. People v. Hasse, 291 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (1968).
62. Collins v. Northwest Casualty Co., 39 P.2d 986, 989 (Wash. 1935).
63. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
64. Id. at 600.
65. A "spouse, individually and without intervention of the court, without the
appointment of a guardian, has such authority [to discontinue life-sustaining treatment] under
common law, if necessary." Guardianship of McInnis, 584 N.E.2d 1389, 1390 (Ohio 1991).
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reasons and confide their innermost thoughts and desires. These and other
relationships mandate that "family" should reflect and respect emotional
connections, not simply, or solely, kinship or marital union. Some state
legislation" and judicial opinions' are beginning to give credence to the
importance of relationships beyond the outdated concept of the traditional
family. More legal recognition is necessary to bring the courts, hospitals,
and state legislators into harmony with today's interpersonal reality.'
The term "family" is used throughout this Comment to refer to all
individuals who have developed significant relationships with each other.
The individual with whom the patient has formed emotional bonds will
"treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause."'
"The most obvious decision makers are those who love us... or
are obligated to care for and about us... family and friends most closely
fit these requirements. " ' Opponents of this position, fearful of the
slippery slope of passive euthanasia,' contend that family members might
have self-serving interests, such as reducing emotional and financial
turmoil, that might encourage premature cessation of medical treatment for
their loved ones. The possibility exists that a family's claim of a patient's
prior wish to "die with dignity" is actually a ploy to hasten the patient's
death because of avarice, dislike, or an attempt to put an end to the drain
on the family's resources. ' However, in the words of Chief Justice
Burger, "the statist notion that governmental power should supersede
parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect
children is repugnant to American tradition."' The vast majority of
families make medical treatment decisions in their loved ones' best
interests; yet their actions are often delayed, restricted, and scrutinized by
governmental mechanisms designed to frustrate the few who would abuse
66. N. Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2965 (McKinney 1993), recognizes "a close friend' as
a potential decision maker for cardio-pulmonary treatment decisions.
67. In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1992) (granting lesbian partner
guardianship of physically and mentally handicapped partner after eight years of legal action).
Sharon Kowalski had been injured in an automobile accident in 1982. Id.
68. Statistics reveal that nearly half of marriages end in divorce. In addition to the
many possible constructions of the family outlined above, some divorced persons establish
new family units with "her and his children" in one household, yet may never remarry.
69. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987).
70. Bopp and Avila, supra note 22, at 789 n.56 (citing Glover, A Philosophical
Analysis of Substitute Decision-Making: The Case of Ms. Nancy Cruzan, 5 MIDWEST MED.
ETHICS 10 (1989)).
71. Id. at 813, nn.190-91.
72. In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 747 (Wash. 1983).
73. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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such power. Unfortunately, it is the patient and her family on whom the
burden of delay must fall.
No potential actor in this drama is free of unconscious or
potentially self-serving motives; yet the family is the entity most often
criticized. "The physician's aggressive treatment may reflect his own fear
of death and dying, his concern with demonstrating professional
competence, or his desire to generate a large fee."' Another physician
arguing against treatment may reflect his or her personal views about the
physician's role in easing suffering or comforting the dying, or reflect the
reality of needing another hospital bed for a more hopeful prognosis.'
Of judges, medical personnel, and families, the latter category is
the most closely associated with the patient and the most familiar with her
life, preferences, and fears. Family members and close friends are better
able to compare the patient's current degree of participation in life to the
former (if different) degree of participation. Families therefore are the
best choice for making unwelcome and excruciatingly painful decisions
regarding cessation of medical treatment. The problem, however, is that
"courts require a higher quantum of justification than is typically
available,"' and those most likely to know what the patient would have
wanted often base this on intuitive, nonverbal knowledge, which is
difficult to prove in a court of law." These decisions can never
realistically be made by a purely logical, analytical test,' despite the
court's attempts to impose an analytical framework. "Complete objectivity
... is neither possible nor desirable, and its absence should not be seen as
a problem.""
IV. DECISIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REQUESTS TO
END MEDICAL TREATMENT
The current legal-medical decision making system is founded
upon a general tendency to accept the medical presumption for treatment,
forcing families to use legal measures to overcome this presumption. so
74. Fentiman, supra note 6, at 811.
75. Id.
76. Rhoden, supra note 11, at 390.
77. Id. at 391.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id. at 440.
80. Id. at 379 (citing In re Conroy 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (NJ. 1983)).
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Courts have acquiesced to the medical preference for obsessive,
aggressivea treatment for many terminally ill and persistent vegetative
patients, even though "physicians' reactions to terminal or chronic illness
reflect a complex interaction of ethical values, medical socialization, the
impact of medical technology, the fear of legal liability, and the relative
power and authority of physicians and hospitals vis-a-vis patients."'
There appears to be no empirical data proving the inherent
superiority of juridical or medical decision making over family members
in medical treatment decisions for incompetent persons. Several state
constitutions, as noted before,' have explicitly guaranteed an individual's
right to privacy with regard to medical decision making. Case law,
however, still contains far too many examples of judicial rationalizing5 '
and state posturing in the name of parens patriae.' The presumption
against the family and in favor of court-controlled decision making
subjugated to the state's interests continues." '  The following Section
describes the existing range of decision making procedures and indicates
how a particular state's constitution can impact the process.87
81. Rhoden, supra note 11, at 421.
82. Id. at 420.
83. For a discussion of state guarantees of privacy, see supra note 29.
84. We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome question
- whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a person
incapable of making his own decision - as constituting a "gratuitous
encroachment" on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life
and death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate
investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of
government was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of the
lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent
the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly motivated or
impressively constituted.
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1977).
It is important to note that there is no acknowledgment of family interests or
participation in the decision making process.
85. The literal meaning of this term is "parent of the country," and refers to the
traditional role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such
as juveniles or the insane. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
86. Countervailing state interests are generally founded upon four concerns: 1) the
preservation of life, 2) the prevention of suicide, 3) the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties, and 4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Deel v.
Syracuse Veterans Admin. Medical Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231, 233-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); see
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
87. Marks & Morgan, supra note 29, at 497.
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A. Substitute Judgment Standard
Courts called on to decide cases involving the request to terminate
life-sustaining medical treatment for an incompetent or incapacitated
patient generally employ a substitute judgment analysis or a best interests
analysis. The substitute judgment analysis is one in which:
IThe judge, after hearing, must try to identify the choice
which would be made by the incompetent, taking into account
the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of
the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-
making process of the competent person.5
As established in In Re Quinlan,s' and further refined in
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,9" the substituted
judgment decision is a subjective process that rests on two assumptions:
(1) the incompetent person shares the same rights as a competent person;
and (2) a surrogate may exercise these rights based on a personal judgment
of what the patient would have chosen if competent.' The substituted
judgment doctrine is most useful when prior evidence aids the court in
assessing the patient's wishes. Substituted judgment becomes less reliable
when there is not a strong indication of a patient's prior wishes" or when
the patient was never competent and never able to partake of or interact
with the surrounding social environment. In such cases, the decision
maker must impose a best interests standard or quality of life standard on
the patient.
88. In re Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992) (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
at 431).
89. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976) (diverging from in In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985). The father of a previously competent young woman requested permission
to disconnect her from her respirator. Id.
90. 370 N.E.2d 417, 428-31 (Mass. 1977). The guardian ad litem of profoundly
retarded man requested refusal of life-saving medical treatment that would disorient the
patient and cause him considerable pain. Id.
91. Kevin Quinn, Substituted Judgment: The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients:
The capacity for Interpersonal Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 897, 911 n.70 (1988).
92. Id. at 912.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 1994]
B. Best Interests Standard
The best interests test generally is employed by the court when
the patient has never expressed, or had the capacity to express, any
preference related to the cessation of medical treatment. As opposed to
the substitute judgment analysis, which attempts to exercise any past stated
preferences of the patient, the best interests analysis looks at objective,
relevant facts apart from the patient's preferences, including but not
limited to "the patient's age, level of consciousness, condition, and
isolation, together with the restrictions on his or her physical freedom."'
In In re Conroy," the court rearticulated the substitute judgment
standards of Quinlan and Saikewicz, but further established two versions of
the best interests test for use when there is no clear and convincing proof
of a patient's attitude about termination of treatment.' The limited-
objective test requires some trustworthy evidence that the patient would
have refused treatment." The pure-objective test is to be utilized when
there is no trustworthy evidence, and (1) the burdens of initiating or
continuing life-sustaining treatment "clearly and markedly" outweighed the
benefits, and (2) the "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain of the
patient's life" would be such that the effect of administering life-sustaining
treatment would be inhumane.' The imposition of these tests by the
New Jersey Supreme Court diluted the sympathetic approach for the
family as established in Quinlan by making it more difficult for a family
member to prove the patient's wishes. Furthermore, the court's emphasis
on pain as the determining factor is largely irrelevant for two reasons:
Some medical experts believe that persistently vegetative patients do not
experience pain at a perceptible level of consciousness, and modem
medication can now reduce or eliminate pain for conscious patients and
would certainly be as effective for unconscious ones as well.
93. Stewart G. Pollack, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and by What
Standards?, 41 RUTGERS. L. REV. 505, 520 (1990).
94. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The nephew of an incompetent,
institutionalized, elderly woman sought removal of a nasogastric tube inserted by a physician.
Mrs. Conroy's nephew believed that his aunt would not have wanted to be subjected to the
treatment and artificially prolonged. The trial court granted permission for removal of the
tube and the guardian ad litem appealed. Even though Mrs. Conroy died while the appeal
was pending, the appellate court reversed, holding that withdrawal of the tube would be
tantamount to killing her. The Conroy case outlined requirements for deciding to terminate
or withhold medical treatment for incompetent patients and is considered the benchmark in
this area of the law. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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The judge is trained in the law, yet is personally unfamiliar with
the details and realities of an incompetent's life. Surely the family in its
broadest sense is a better decision maker. Yet the state's interest in
sustaining life, established and justified through the parens patriae doctrine
and reinforced through continuing court involvement in many states,
tremendously affects the ability of families or persons close to the
incompetent patient to make life-ending treatment decisions.
In contrast with such examples of judicial resolution, some states
have concluded that family members or previously selected surrogates are
better determinants than a judge or representative of the state." In
accord with the President's Commission report, these states are concluding
that "decision making about life-sustaining care is rarely improved by
resort to courts.""
V. STATE MECHANISMS FOR DETERMINATION OF
CESSATION OF MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISIONS
A. Massachusetts
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts uses a substitute
judgment analysis to determine cessation of medical treatment
decisions' and continues to rest decisional power firmly and totally
within the court system."' Recognizing that the use of substitute
judgment for never-competent persons is a "legal fiction, " " the court in
Doe nevertheless followed its own lead in Saikewicz, and emphasized the
court's reliance on objective criteria as a means of bringing "the
substituted judgment into step with the values and desires of the affected
individual."1
98. Pollack, supra note 93, at 538; see also In re Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Ind.
1991) (holding in relevant part: . . . that Sue Ann's parents had authority under the Health
Care Consent Act 'to consent, as surrogate decisionmakers, to the withdrawal of artificially
delivered nutrition and hydration from their daughter . . . who would otherwise remain
indefinitely in a persistent vegetative state .... "); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.
1976) (authorizing Karen Quinian's father to direct the removal of life-support systems).
99. DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 36, at 247.
100. See, e.g., Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992).
101. Refer to the quote from Saikevicz, supra note 84.
102. Substituted judgment for a never-competent person "is the legal mechanism by
which society (at least in Massachusetts) attempts to vindicate liberty interests, albeit through
a legal fiction." Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1268.
103. Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
430-31 (Mass. 1977)).
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Massachusetts judges must evaluate five factors before substituting
their judgment for that of an incompetent patient's: the patient's expressed
preferences, the patient's religious convictions and any relationship to
refusal of treatment, impact on the patient's family, possibility of adverse
side effects, and future prognosis with and without treatment.'" The
lower court in Doe determined, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed, that judges could make their decisions based on "a
'preponderance of the evidence with an extra measure of evidentiary
protection' [by reason of] specific findings of fact after a 'careful review
of the evidence.'" 1" The higher court emphasized the seriousness of
these decisions and the ultimate power of the judge to make them by
"forcefully impress[ing] on judges... [that] they are required to set forth
their findings in 'meticulous detail' [rather] than . . . [by] merely
label[ing] their findings as meeting a particular standard.'"
Massachusetts therefore stops short of applying more stringent
"beyond a reasonable doubt" or "clear and convincing evidence"
standards."°  However, the court's emphasis on exacting and meticulous
fact-finding tends to weigh the balance in favor of medical interests rather
than family interests, primarily because, as previously noted, the family
may not be in possession of uncontrovertible facts supporting a patient's
purported wish not to be artificially maintained.
B. New York
The State of New York has a recognized hierarchy of persons
eligible to make decisions regarding "Do Not Resuscitate" orders for
incompetent persons and a procedure for reviewing those decisions. The
statute is limited to only the cessation of, or refraining from initiating,
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation,1 g recognizes a competent person's right
to issue an order not to resuscitate and will not review or override that
person's decision if witnessed and subsequently recorded in the patient's
medical chart.119  The statute further recognizes the authority of a
designated health care agent to act on the patient's behalf."' If a health
care agent has not been designated, the state will select a health care proxy
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1271.
106. Id.
107. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Mass. 1992).
108. N.Y. PUB. HEATH LAw § 2968 (McKinney 1993).
109. Id. § 2964.
110. Id. § 2965.
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who is able, willing, and competent to act as surrogate for the patient from
a priority listing of people. The list includes: (1) a committee of the
person or a guardian (although section 2965 does not require the
appointment of a committee of the person or a guardian), (2) a spouse, (3)
a son or daughter eighteen years of age or older, (4) a parent, (5) a
brother or sister eighteen years of age or older, or (6) a close friend. The
selected surrogate "shall make a decision regarding cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation on the basis of the adult patient's wishes, including a
consideration of the patient's. religious and moral beliefs, or, if the
patient's wishes are not known and cannot be ascertained, on the basis of
the patient's best interests. "m
The surrogate may decide against resuscitation only after the
attending physician and an independent physician concur that (1) the
patient has a terminal condition, (2) the patient is permanently
unconscious, (3) resuscitation would be futile, or (4) resuscitation would
impose an extraordinary burden on the patient when balanced against
probable outcomes.l"
The surrogate is presumptively granted decision making power to
withdraw or withhold resuscitation and is therefore not required to go to
court or provide extensive "evidence" before making this decision."U
The attending physician or any other physician may at any time, however,
cancel the surrogate's order upon a determination that the patient no longer
suffers from any one of the four conditions specified in Section
2965(3)(c)(i-iv) (listed in the preceding paragraph).
The New York statute mandates that each hospital establish a
dispute mediation system,'" whether through a newly constituted body
or through an existing hospital committee. The dispute mediation system
111. Id. § 2965 (3)(a).
112. Id. § 2965 (3)(c).
113. New York law defines a surrogate as "the person selected to make a decision
regarding resuscitation on behalf of another person." N.Y. PuB. HEATH LAw § 2961(17)
(McKinney 1993). Allowing a surrogate to make a life or death decision for an incompetent
appears to be contrary to the prior common law in New York. See In re Storer, 420 N.E.2d
64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied sub noma. Storer v. Storer 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also New
York v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296 (N.Y. 1984) ("In the absence of such evidence of
personal intent [there, due to the patient's incompetence] a third party has no recognized right
to decide that the patient's quality of life has declined to a point where treatment should be
withheld and the patient should be allowed to die."); In re Kerr, 517 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("When a person is not competent to make such a life or death
decision, the court must intervene in favor of life prolonging treatment, despite the feelings
and desires of those closest to the patient."); Susan M. Golden, Do Not Resuscitate Orders:
A Matter of Life and Death in New York, 4 J. CoNTEP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 449 (1988).
114. N.Y. PuB. HEATH LAW § 2970 (1)(a) (McKinney 1993).
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is mandated to mediate all disputes, including those regarding the
determination of the patient's capacity, among all potential parties.'
During the mediation process, Do Not Resuscitate orders are revoked and
cannot be reissued unless the dispute has been resolved or seventy-two
hours have passed without resolution. All participants involved in the
mediation are entitled to seek judicial review."1
If any party initiates a special proceeding challenging a decision
regarding the issuance of an order not to resuscitate, that party must show,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the decision is contrary to the
patient's wishes or best interests. 7  A patient's refusal to consent to a
Do Not Resuscitate order is not subject to judicial review.' In sum,
the New York mechanism provides an early presumption in favor of the
family or selected surrogate, but somewhat dismantles that presumption by
making it easy for physicians to intercede and restrict enactment of those
decisions.
C. New Jersey
The 1976 New Jersey case of Karen Ann Quinlan"' is still a
significant decision, representing a genuine sensitivity to,' and
recognition of, the importance of the family as the ultimate decision maker
in cessation of medical treatment situations. Karen Quinlan was a
previously healthy, young woman who, after losing consciousness,
remained in a persistent vegetative state. After the physician denied her
father's request to disconnect her from a respirator, her father sought a
judgment of incompetency, which would give him, as guardian, the right
to order the discontinuance of extraordinary medical procedures. When
Mr. Quinlan's resulting lawsuit was rejected by the lower court, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted an immediate appeal.'
The state supreme court focused on Karen's prognosis.
Determining that it was unlikely that Karen would ever return to a
cognitive and sapient life,'n the state supreme court rejected the lower
court's contention that Mr. Quinlan's guardianship would cause him
115. Id. § 2972 (1-4).
116. Id. § 2972 (3).
117. Id. § 2973 (1).
118. Id.
119. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
120. Rhoden, supra note 11, at 383.
121. Id.
122. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 669.
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anguish and would distort his decision making processes.1 The court
stated:
We disagree, for we sense from the whole record before us that
while Mr. Quinlan feels a natural grief, and understandably
sorrows because of the tragedy which has befallen his daughter,
his strength of purpose and character far outweighs these
sentiments and qualifies him eminently for guardianship of the
person as well as the property of his daughter. Hence we
discern no valid reason to overrule the statutory intendment of
preference of the next of kin.'
The court's assessment of the issues in Quinlan is representative
of the way courts should treat these cases,' and could have paved the
way much earlier to more caring and humane resolutions of these complex
issues. However, Quinlan deviated from Conroy,' which slightly
shifted the focus to the proof of the patient's best interests, rather than the
right of the family to determine the choice of treatment if the patient can
never recover.' In the years following Quinlan,2' courts generally
acknowledged the state's interests but found that the "interest [in
preserving life] weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims."'' This
analysis was applied in almost every right-to-die ruling after that case.'
However, the Supreme Court in Cruzan"1 clearly reestablished the
predominant power of the state's interests over the individual's.
D. Missouri
The State of Missouri controls decisions concerning the cessation
of medical treatment through its judicial process and its extremely difficult
test for proving that cessation of treatment is the patient's preference.
Missouri uses a clear and convincing standard with the burden of proof on
123. Id. at 670.
124. Id.
125. Rhoden, supra note 11, at 383.
126. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
127. Id.
128. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
129. Id. at 678.
130. Bopp & Avila, supra note 22, at 794.
131. Cruzanv. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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the party (family) requesting treatment discontinuance.' The United
States Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Cruzanm held that
Missouri's use of the clear and convincing standard for determination of
Nancy's prior wishes did not violate her rights under the United States
Constitution. "The case of Nancy Cruzan illustrates how government can
protect even minimal life to the detriment of one's right to refuse to
continue such an existence."'
Missouri's parens patriae doctrine protects life of all definitions.
Nancy Cruzan's parents, family, and friends were stymied for more than
eight years in their efforts to allow her to die. After the Supreme Court's
1990 opinion, however, the case was reconsidered by the State of Missouri
when "new evidence" was presented pursuant to Nancy's previously stated
wishes. At that time, perhaps content with the strong grant of power
afforded by the nation's highest Court, the State of Missouri decided that
the evidence did meet its "clear and convincing" standard, and Nancy's
artificial life-support mechanisms were allowed to be removed. She died
eight days later.
More recently, the State of Missouri acquiesced in another long
battle over a family's request to terminate treatment. Since November of
1987, Christine Busalacchi had been a resident at the same state-run
hospital as Nancy Cruzan, and her father had attempted similar legal
action to allow her to die. His earlier efforts were denied, and in 1990,
he was even forbidden to remove her from the state nursing facility or
from the state itself. However, early in 1993, Missouri's Attorney
General requested a dismissal of the case before the state supreme court,
in effect leaving Mr. Busalacchi free to decide his daughter's fate.' He
transferred her to another hospital, where she died after her feeding tube
was removed.' It is uncertain whether this indicates a softening of
Missouri's intractable standard of proof."7
132. Id.; In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. App. Mar. 5, 1991),
reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Mar. 26, 1991), cause ordered transferred to Mo. S. Ct. (Apr.
15, 1991), appeal dismissed No. 73677 (Mo. Jan. 26, 1993).
133. Cruzan, 447 U.S. at 261.
134. Marks & Morgan, supra note 29, at 467.
135. THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Comatose Woman Dies Afier Support Removed,
March 8, 1993, at 3A.
136. Id.
137. It should be noted that in other situations Missouri is also reluctant to relinquish
control over the right to forego life-sustaining treatment. Generally, state statutes that deal
with life-prolonging measures are limited by either "imposing a variety of conditions
precedent" or by "limiting the procedures encompassed by the statute." Marks & Morgan,
supra note 29, at 470. Missouri has a very restrictive statute. Id. In considering the
Missouri Living Will Act, Judge Welliver noted in dissent in Cruzan v. Harmon:
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VI. MEDIATION-BASED FAMILY-CENTERED DECISION
MAKING
For every horror story like the Cruzan's or Busalacchi's, there
are now more and more courts in other states more sympathetic and
respectful of the family.
[This] judicial reaction to the death-and-dying issue reflects
basic beliefs about the roles of the family, the medical
profession, and the courts in our society. By delegating
decision-making to the family, courts have affirmed their belief
that the family, more than anyone else, is familiar with the
patient's preferences and is best situated to make medical
decisions for an incompetent patient. Because courts are
returning decision-making to the incompetent patient's family,
hospitals and other health care facilities should consider making
available the services of a bioethicist or of an institutional
ethics committee. Recourse to such committees is consistent
with judicial deregulation of these deeply personal decisions
and with the attempt to devise appropriate and responsive
procedures.u
The above comment, by an associate justice on the New Jersey
Supreme Court, suggests what this Author hopes is a perspective shared
by an increasing number of courts. Informal discussions with hospital
physicians indicate that many life and death decisions already occur at the
patient's bedside, away from the courtroom." These decisions need to
Yes, we Missourians can sign an instrument directing the withholding
or withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, but, after the Missouri
amendments, "death prolonging procedure" does not include: (1)
"mT1he administration of medication," (2) "the performance of medical
procedure deemed necessary to provide comfort, care as to alleviate
pain" (3) "the performance of any procedure to provide nutrition" or
(4) "the performance of any procedure to provide . . . hydration." If
we cannot authorize withdrawing or withholding "medication,"
"nutrition" or 'hydration," then what can we authorize to be withheld
in Missouri? The Missouri Living Will Act is a fraud on Missourians
who believe we have been given a right to execute a living will, and to
die naturally, respectably, and in peace.
Cnzanv. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 441 (Mo. 1988).
138. Pollack, supra note 93, at 538.
139. Informal conversation with Dr. Taniguchi, Children's Hospital, Columbus, Ohio.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 9:2 1994]
be made in an atmosphere of support and compassion. Family members
may never have encountered an issue of such enormity, finality, and
emotional import. Without a supportive environment for decision making,
opportunities for confusion, miscommunication, and conflict are rife -
between family members, and between the family and the hospital staff.
An early warning mechanism for anticipating difficulties and
identifying potential conflict among decision makers could eliminate many
small conflicts before they escalate. A procedure for enhancing
communication among the parties, and for providing informal mediation
when disagreement or confusion is first suspected, may facilitate resolution
and minimize the family's emotional cost. Mandatory referral to formal
mediation for unresolvable conflicts, followed by mandatory but non-
binding adjudication, all within the hospital, would provide procedural due
process for all parties, yet keep the conflict in an environment best suited
for its resolution. Only when all of the above measures have been
exhausted should access to the courts by opposing parties be permitted.
Many courts have acknowledged the inappropriateness of the civil
court system for resolution of these moral and ethical issues. The nature
of the judicial system is adverse to humane treatment of these issues: 14 0
It is lengthy, adversarial, and expensive. More importantly, it does not
provide opportunities for opposing parties to attempt resolution or
140.
The Brophy case . . . illustrate[s] some of the difficulties that can arise
when courts are asked to settle disputes about life-sustaining treatments.
To begin with, the legal process may be protracted. Even with an
expedited appeals process, the final decision in the Brophy case was
handed down 19 months after Patricia Brophy's original petition.
Also, adversarial courtroom proceedings often are not the
best way to establish medical facts and judgments accurately. An
important issue in the Brophy case was whether patients in persistent
vegetative states suffer from hunger or thirst if tube feedings are
withheld. Because doctors testified on both sides of this question, the
issue became controversial. There is consensus in the medical
literature, however, that patients in persistent vegetative states do not
feel pain. . . . When such errors of fact go uncorrected throughout the
appeals process, the resulting court decisions will be based on incorrect
medical judgments and may cause confusion and cynicism.
Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, Arifcial Feeding - Solid Ground, Not a Slippery Slope,
318 NEw. ENO. J. MED., 286-90 (1988).
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compromise.""
How do we create alternative mechanisms? Will mediation within
the hospital inordinately burden the system? Who should supervise and
evaluate? What would encourage participation?
This Section proposes an alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
system for hospital implementation that would address treatment decisions
more effectively and humanely, and could also be used for other conflicts
within the hospital environment. The system would be created by
modifying the existing institutional ethics committee. By revising the
structure and identifying new purposes for ethics committees, emphasis,
support, and recognition can be on the family - where it belongs. An
ADR system may also help the doctor do his or her job with less fear of
litigation or need for defensive medical actions, because the family would
be the ultimate decision maker.'
A. The Hospital Ethics Committee - Original
Creation and Purpose
The. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has defined
an ethics committee as a "[c]onsultative committee in a hospital or other
institution whose role is to analyze ethical dilemmas and to advise and
educate health care providers, patients, and families regarding difficult
treatment decisions."4 Other definitions have emphasized the
multidisciplinary'" or interdisciplinary nature of the committee structure
and the tendency for committees to "deal with issues regarding the
withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment from patients who
141. "There is nearly universal agreement, especially among judges, that these issues
should not come to court unless there is a clear question of law, or if all alternative means
for resolving the dispute have been tried and failed." Joan Mclver Bison & Mary Beth West,
Hospital Ethics Committees: Mediation and Case Review, FORUM, Summer/Fall 1991, at 23.
142. "Until the present liability system is repaired, we have no chance of eliminating
defensive medicine practices and of returning standards of care to what patients need to have
done; not what professionals feel they must do in order to protect themselves." Orrin G.
Hatch, Reforms Needed to Increase Access to Health Care, FORUM, Summer/Fall 1991, at 7
(estimating that S.25 of every health care dollar is spent on defensive medicine).
143. Susan M. Wolf, Fthics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a
Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798, 801 n.18 (1991) (citing OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
ELDERLY 444 (1987)).
144. Wolf, supra note 143, at 801 n.18 (citing R. Cranford & A. Doudera,
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING 5 (1984)).
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lack decision making capacities."14s
The hospital ethics committee is a relatively recent phenomenon,
developing over the last decade in response to increased concern over life-
sustaining treatment decisions. 1' More than one writer has traced the
origin of the ethics committee concept to a 1975 law review article by a
Texas physician,'4  the suggestions of which were subsequently
incorporated by nursing home administrators" into the ethics committee
for Karen Ann Quinlan."
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlant m recommended
that the committee "validate requests by clinicians, families, or surrogates
to remove life-sustaining equipment if the committee, like the court,
concluded that 'there is no reasonable possibility of [the patient ever
regaining] a cognitive, sapient state. ' " 'l This early clinical role of the
ethics committee was expanded in 1982 by the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research.' "[The Commission proposed that the ethics committee
might prove a more useful mechanism to resolve questions of clinical
ethics than the courts. " ' In re Torres,' a 1983 Minnesota case, was
the first casets to consider the recommendations of three independent
biomedical ethics committees in reaching a decision regarding a comatose
patient with irreversible brain damage. Based on the advice of two of
these committees, the court ruled that the respirator could be disconnected
145. Diane E. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committee in Health Care Institutions - Is
It 7ime?, 50 MD. L. REV. 746 (1991) [hereinafter Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics] (citing
Cranford & Doudera, supra note 144, at 6-7).
146. John C. Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees, 50
MD. L. REV. 859, 869 (1991).
147. Karen Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should
Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6 (1975).
148. B. HOSFORD, MAKING YOUR MEDICAL DECISIONS: YOUR RIGHTS AND HARSH
DECISIONS TODAY 126 (1982).
149. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
150. Id. at 671.
151. Id., cited in Gail J. Povar, Evaluating Ethics Committees: What Do We Mean by
Success?, 50 Mo. L. REV. 904, 904 n.1 (1991).
152. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 187-188
(1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
153. Povar, supra note 151, at 904-05.
154. 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
155. Paula C. Hollinger, Hospital Ethics Committees and the Law, 50 MD. L. REV.
742, 743 (1991).
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if the patient's legal guardian so requested.' A major increase in the
mid-1980s of "infant care review committees" concerned with life-saving
intervention for handicapped infants brought the "ethics committee
movement into the institutional mainstream."' Whereas less than one
percent of hospitals had ethics committees in 1982,' by 1985, more
than sixty percent of American hospitals and almost ten percent of nursing
homes had ethics committees."'
There appear to be no reliable data on the effectiveness of ethics
committees. 1' Committees vary widely in membership, procedures,
perceived roles, and responsibilities.' Criticisms of ethics committees
generally concern a lack of focus or conflicting purpose. "Some so-called
ethics committees have as goals confirming prognoses, providing
emotional support for care givers, or reducing legal liability for physicians
or hospitals.""
Although the stated purpose of ethics committees since their
inception has been to protect the patient, concerns have arisen
that the committees may have conflicting goals of protecting the
patient, protecting the health care providers, and protecting the
health care institution. Such a lack of priorities or focus makes
156. Id. at 743 (citing In re Tortes, 357 N.W. 2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984)).
157. Id.
158. DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 36, at 446.
159. AM. Hosp. Assoc. NEws, Dec. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 1, cited in Hoffmann,
Regulating Ethcs, supra note 145, at 746-47.
160. In a multi-state survey of hospital ethics committees, 91% of non-federal hospitals
in Maryland reported having an ethics committee, but 15% were inactive, meaning they
never met or had infrequently met. The District of Columbia reported 78% of hospitals with
ethics committees. Virginia reported only 25% of ethics committees within hospitals, with
33% of those inactive. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics, supra note 145, at 756-58, (citing
Diane E. Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics Committees Make a Difference?: A
Study of Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia
(1991) (to be published in a forthcoming issue of Law, Medicine & Health Care)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the MARYLAND LAW REVIEW) [hereinafter Hoffmann,
Study]).
161. One committee's view: "We have never formally stated in writing the exact
purpose or purposes of our committee but have decided to proceed in an informal manner...
. We felt that to formalize our objectives might be counterproductive to the work of our
committee." Bernard Lo, Behind Closed Doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees,
317 NEw ENO. J. MED. 46, 47 (1987).
162. Id. at 47. One hospital administrator suggested using the ethics committee as a
"public relations tool" for unpopular decisions. Id. at 47 (citing J.W. Summers, Closing
Unprofitable Services: Ethical Issues and Management Responses, 30 Hosp. HEALTH SERV.
ADM. 8 (1985)).
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patients particularly vulnerable.'s
Other critics attack their lack of accountability, absence of rationale for
their recommendations, and lack of broad-based representation.1"
A 1990 American Hospital Association Management Advisory
suggested certain activities as "particularly suitable" for ethics committees:
(1) directing educational programs on ethics, (2) creating a forum for
discussion of ethical issues, (3) case consultation and providing resources
to people involved in decision making, (4) conducting retrospective review
of bioethical decisions, (5) developing institutional policies regarding
bioethical issues, and (6) networking with other committees for educational
purposes.
165
Of the activities listed above, case consultation has proven to be
one of the "more contentious roles assumed by institutional ethics
committees."'" Committee opinions are often promoted as merely
advisory," but their institutional and psychological force often creates a
mandatory impression on those requesting guidance.1"5 Even the
President's Commission Report in 1983 reported that although only
eighteen percent of ethics committees perceived their purpose as making
final treatment decisions, thirty-one percent characterized final decision
making as one of their actual functions.169
Committees have also been criticized as being anti-patient, with a
predominately professional medical membership."' The procedures of
many committees limit or prevent patients or family members from
attending sessions.' Recent literature suggests that many committees
163. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics, supra note 145, at 767 (citation omitted).
164. Id.
165. AMERICAN HOsPITAL ASSOCIATION, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY: ETHICS
COMMITTEEs (1990), cited in Povar, supra note 151, at 905-06; see also Fletcher, supra note
146, at 876 (noting that ethics committee has four major functions: provide a forum,
educate, consult, and develop policies).
166. Povar, supra note 151, at 912.
167. Wolf, supra note 143, at 809 (criticizing the "myth that committees are purely
advisory").
168. Karen Ritchie, When It's Not Really Optional, 1988 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25,
cited in Wolf, supra note 143, at 809, n.43.
169. DECIDING TO FOREGO, supra note 36, at 451 (table F3).
170. Povar, supra note 151, at 912.
171. A 1982 survey indicated that only 25% of committees that reviewed cases
permitted patients to bring cases to the committee, with only 19% allowing patients to attend
meetings. Forty-four percent of the committees allowed family members to attend meetings.
Lo, supra note 161, at 47 (citing S. J. Youngner et al., A National Survey of Hospital Ethics
Conmittees, 11 CRITICAL CARE MED. 902 (1983).
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do not provide patients access to the committee's services at all.r
Other literature indicates that many physicians and other health care
personnel are often unaware of the committee's existence, let alone its
purpose. 17
3
Two distinct models of ethics committee function have developed
over the years, with widely different purposes and impacts.17' The
consultation model of an ethics committee focuses on the needs of
caregivers with no procedural protection to the patient." 5  The
adjudicatory model focuses on patients' rights and protections when the
committee is giving advice or rendering treatment decisions. The danger
is the fluid transition between the two models. 7'
That poses real dangers, especially for patients and their
families, who may not be included at all in the committee's
process. This dangerous double identity reflects the fact that
we are still in the midst of a struggle between traditional
physician paternalism and a newer effort to recognize patient's
rights .... 1I7 The physician is likely to concentrate on
medical effectiveness, while the patient is likely to concentrate
on whether the prospective benefits of treatment outweigh the
physical, psychological, and other burdens to her.17
It is essential to recognize the adjudicatory function of ethics
committees and to provide mechanisms to ensure due process for patients
and families. "All indications are that most [ethics committees] fail even
to give the patient notice and an opportunity to be heard, much less other
tools a patient might need to participate effectively in the ethics
committee's proceedings."179 The danger is that because the "advice" of
ethics committees carries "decisive weight" for the many disputes that
never find their way into court "the committee will serve as the forum of
172. Povar, supra note 151, at 913 (citing Roy B. Nash et al., The Hospital Ethics
Committee: Who Knows It Exists and How to Access It, 9 H.E.F.C. 9-11 (1989)).
173. Thirty-nine percent of physicians and health care workers were unaware of their
hospital's ethics committee, even though it had been in existence at least two years and
conducted at least five consults within the last year. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics, supra
note 145, at 760, n.90 (citing Hoffmann, Study, supra note 160).
174. Wolf, supra note 143, at 804-05.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 805.
178. Id. at 813.
179. Wolf, supra note 143, at 802.
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last resort."
Ethics committees thus have always been a battleground on
which traditional physician paternalism and control have gone
head to head with the newer commitment to patient's rights.
To this day the battle remains unresolved. That is the root of
ethics committees' double identity. They spring from modem
medical ethics and its commitment to patient's rights, but have
been thoroughly dominated and shaped by physicians. Thus it
is no surprise that the very ambivalence that many (if not most)
physicians feel toward ceding decisional authority to patients is
played out in the ethics committee. This is all the more
predictable because the very cases that come to the ethics
committee are the hard cases, the ones in which there is some
dispute between the doctor and patient or patient's
surrogate.181
Despite the criticisms, this Comment contends that ethics
committees can become a fairer pro-patient force in the medical arena,
especially with regard to life-sustaining treatment decisions. Ethics
committees currently exist in a majority of hospitals and a sizeable
minority of nursing homes. They have operated within the health care
system long enough to gain some measure of acceptability, if only among
facility administrators and committee participants. They already make
decisions and have an impact on patients and their families. However,
many ethics committees "fail or flounder" for lack of institutional support,
recognition, or underuse.' "The time has come for ethics programs to
be part of the culture of health care and to gain enough independence and
community support to be viewed as credible institutions. In the 1990s,
ethics programs must become accepted actors in the health care arena and
the communities they serve.""
180. Id.
181. Id. at 827.
182. Fletcher, supra note 146, at 875.
183. Id.
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B. A New Design and Purpose for Ethics
Committees
The focus, organization, and procedures of existing ethics
committees must be examined to assure recognition of the special needs of
the patient and the patient's family when considering termination of
treatment decisions. In a sense, the committee must perform a patient's
advisory and advocacy function, to counter the imbalance of power
afforded doctors and hospitals.'
The ethics committee has considerable procedural power due to
its ability to control the procedures for decision making.
Hospital staff committee members collectively also carry
associational power. When all of these sources of power are
contrasted with the relatively few sources of power that patients
and family have, the imbalance is striking."s
In addition to focusing on the patient, specific dispute resolution
procedures must be instituted "before there is a real need, so they can
become known; gain credibility and acceptance, and be viewed as a valid
and effective forum for resolving disputes. . . . [ihey must [also] be
perceived as fair and equitable."' Ury, Brett, and Goldberg propose a
dispute resolution model "that would direct disputes along a low-cost path
to resolution. " The model would put the focus on the party's
interests, build in "loopbacks" to negotiation, provide low-cost rights and
power backups, provide consultation before mediation and feedback after,
arrange procedures in a low cost to high cost sequence, and provide
184. The composition of ethics committees may not reassure patients that
their wishes and interests are represented. Typically, most members of
ethics committees are physicians, who may assess the importance of
medical problems or the risks and benefits of treatment differently from
patients. Patients or surrogates who disagree with the committee's
recommendations may say that the composition of the committee was
biased against them.
Lo, supra note 161, at 46-50.
185. Joan M. Gibson & Mary Beth West, Hospital Ethics Committees: Mediation and
Case Review, NIDR FORUM, Summer/Fall 1991, at 22.
186. Michael E. Carbine, Adapting Dispute Resolution Techniques to the Health Care
Field, NIDR FORUM, Summer/Fall 1991, at 16 (citing Robert Stein, a Washington-based
attorney specializing in Dispute Resolution).
187. William L. Ury et al., Designing an Effective Dispute Resolution System, 4
NEGOTIATION J. 413, 414 (1988).
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necessary motivation, skills, and resources."
Disputes over patient care are not always the result of conflicts
over ethical principles or obligations.' These conflicts "may also result
from misunderstandings, stress, or lack of attention to the details of care.
Despite stalemates over conflicting ethical principles or duties, agreements
on particular recommendations for patient care may be possible."'
Ethics committees are well-positioned to improve patient and family
experiences when faced with treatment decisions. If the committee is
visible and easily accessible, and resources exist to correct the patient-
family-physician imbalance, this Author believes that most disputes
concerning cessation of medical treatment for incompetent patients could
be resolved within the hospital structure. As Thomas Metzloff both
suggested and predicted: Dispute resolution in the health care system
could be a "gatekeeper" for the court system.191 Dispute resolution
"procedures could be used to handle certain kinds of cases before they
enter the judicial system, even before attorneys are involved . ..
[H]ealth care providers could offer a statutory dispute resolution option as
the first recourse before going to court. "92
Metzloff, Clark Havinghurst, 1 ' and Michael Carbine contend
that dispute resolution is best used to resolve fact-based health care
issues.'t This Comment, however, proposes that mediation and other
ADR techniques provide humane mechanisms for resolving difficult ethical
and emotional issues as well. Adversarial adjudication generates hostility,
inaccuracy, and emotional devastation. The adversarial system creates
winners and losers, but there are no winners when a family faces a dying
loved one. A hospital ethics committee can provide a range of informal to
more formal procedures to guide a treatment dispute towards resolution.
But certain questions about the DR process must be settled
before such options are offered. For example, how would the
option be offered? ... Is it voluntary or mandated? Would it
188. Id.
189. Lo, supra note 161, at 48.
190. Id.
191. Carbine, supra note 186, at 16 (quoting Thomas Metzloff, Director of the Private
Adjudication Center's Medical Malpractice Research Project).
192. Id.
193. Clark Havinghurst, of Duke University Law School, was quoted in Michael
Carbine's article as saying that "arbitration and other DR techniques are most likely to be
useful in health care disputes that primarily involve matters of fact." id. at 17.
194. These included issues such as Medicare payment denials, medical staff disputes,
nursing home grievances, and licensing and quality assurance activities. Id.
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entail binding or non-binding decisions? Does it provide an
opportunity for the aggrieved individual, whether provider or
consumer, to opt out of the alternative process without penalty?
Who represents the [patient] or provider? Who makes the
decisions?'
1. Structure
The hospital ethics committee should have three goals: (1) to
provide patient and family with additional medical information and advice,
(2) to provide physician peer review, and (3) to operate as a provider of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve treatment decision
disputes. Initially, the committee would provide medical information and
advice on factual matters concerning the patient's condition and prognosis.
At any point, a party should be able to request, and attend, a committee
review of the medical treatment and prognosis by the attending physician.
Requests for counseling, mediation, and arbitration may be initiated by a
patient, iamily member, or health professional, but must stay within the
hospital environment and exhaust all available mechanisms before gaining
access to the courts.
In a family-based decision making model, a broader definition of
family would incorporate non-traditional families and would provide a
method for determining if other persons are more qualified than a blood
relative to decide for a patient. There should be a broad rebuttable
presumption that the family (or chosen decision maker) represents the
patient's best interests. Parties disputing the family's (or chosen decision
maker's) determination should bear the burden of proving the decision is
contrary to the patient's best interest. Examples of this would include
patients estranged from their parents or families and patients with
unmarried or same-sex partners. The burden of proof for challenging the
decision maker should fall on the person attempting to replace the family
as decision maker. The goal in any dispute would be to have each side
hear the other's concerns and come to a solution or consensus.
195. Carbine, supra note 186, at 16.
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2. Initial Contact and Informal Mediation
When a seriously-ill patient first enters the hospital, a hospital-
provided counselor1  (for example, a social worker or pastoral
counselor trained in mediation) should approach the family to offer the
hospital's general reassurance and support.' The counselor could make
sure that the family unit is aware of the ethics committee's counseling,
advice, and mediation services. The counselor could provide printed
material, provide a telephone number for twenty-four hour access to
advice and information, and informally let the family know that their
emotional needs and the patient's physical and emotional needs are
respected by the hospital staff. The written material and reference number
would be particularly effective because during initial admission most
patients and family members are too emotionally preoccupied to absorb
much information.
The counselor should keep informed about the condition of a
terminally ill or incompetent patient and should approach the family
whenever a treatment decision is imminent. Also, if the attending
physician or another health professional recognizes that conflict exists
among family members, the counselor should be notified. If a conflict is
identified early, informal mediation could be offered literally at the
patient's bedside or outside the hospital room. A waiting room or
cafeteria or other non-threatening location would give the counselor-
mediator an opportunity to attempt informal resolution. 9'
A mediator may be able to move the negotiations beyond name-
calling by encouraging the disputants to vent their emotions and
acknowledge the other's perspective. A mediator can help
parties move past a deadlock over positions by getting them to
identify their underlying interests and develop creative solutions
that satisfy those interests. Where each side is reluctant to
196. The counselor can be a staff member or independent counselor from outside the
hospital, but the counselor reports to, and is monitored by, the ethics committee at large, or
designated hospital administrator.
197. Peter Szanton suggested that self-supporting mediation programs needed to develop
procedures (pipelines) that would "direct disputes away from the adversarial paths they
normally follow toward new paths that direct them to dispute resolution screening, and then
on to mediation, arbitration or another dispute resolution process." David O'Connor, The
Design of Self-Supporting Dispute Resolution Programs, 8 NEGOTIATION J. 85, 85 (1992).
198. This process would be similar to that offered in small claims courtrooms in
Columbus, Ohio. Mediation is offered to disputantsjust before their cases are heard by the
magistrate. If they attempt mediation and are not successful, the parties go on to court, but
often informal mediation leads to resolution.
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propose a compromise out of fear of appearing weak, the
mediator can make such a proposal. Mediators are thus well
placed to shift the focus from rights or power to interests.
Mediation can serve as a safety net to keep a dispute from
escalating to a rights procedure, such as litigation.... 1"
Interceding early gives the mediator-counselor the opportunity to
eliminate potential problems resulting from communication deficiencies or
misunderstandings based on incorrect or out-of-date information. If each
party hears the other's views and all parties disconnect their egos from the
actual disagreement, it may be possible to reach a solution.
3. Formal Mediation
Thus far, the ethics committee has been involved only in a
supervisory capacity, by reviewing the activities and weekly (or bi-weekly)
reports of the mediator-counselor. If bedside counseling and informal
mediation are not successful, the counselor-mediator would notify the
disputants that their disagreement would be heard by the formal in-hospital
mediation program.' At this point, a different mediator should be used
to reinforce additional formality. 1 The strength of mediation is its
"capacity to help deal with the problems created by dispute selection and
elaboration and therefore.., its capacity to deescalate the conflict. "'
Among the tools of successful mediators are procedures for
correcting the defects just mentioned: shuttling between parties
199. Ury et al., supra note 187, at 413, 420 (1988). Counselors should receive
mediation and negotiation training, and ideally, all medical and nursing programs should
include some form of alternative dispute resolution training for emerging doctors, nurses, and
other health care professionals.
200. One hospital in Texas provides several levels of mediation. A designer
has trained large numbers of supervisors so that there is always some
supervisor close to the disputants who can mediate. Key individuals in
personnel, pastoral care, and social services have also been identified as
expert providers of formal mediation services. In addition, the design
has agreed to provide professional mediators who can be called on for
assistance in particularly difficult disputes.
Id. at 420.
201. The hospital could possibly have a small contingent of couiiselor-mediators -
perhaps as few as two to four - that could serve to formally mediate disputes handled
previously by the other counselor-mediators.
202. Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Milburn, Erplaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9
NEooTIrON J. 23, 30 (1993).
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who cannot or will not meet, interpreting statements made by
parties who do not understand each other, encouraging trust or
suggesting agreements that do not require trust, allowing a
proud party to concede to the mediator instead of the other
party, reminding the parties about the costs of struggle or
adjudication, and casting doubt on the likelihood that the other
party can be pushed into further concession or that a judge will
rule in one's favor.'
At this mediation session, both parties would be encouraged to
provide evidence supporting their positions. They would be advised that if
a resolution or compromise or joint agreement is not reached,' the
issue would be taken before the ethics committee's adjudicatory board
(Board).2 s
203. Id. (citing PJ. Carnevale & D.G. Pruitt, Negotiation and Mediation, 43 ANNUAL
REvIEw oF PsYCHOLoGY, 531-82 (1992)).
204. The session should be limited to two hours, with each party able to ask for a brief
recess to talk to other family members or relieve the tension.
205. "Primary sentiment for expanding the role of hospital ethics committees and
allowing them to substitute for judicial decisionmaking stems from a handful of judicial
decisions." Quindan, 355 A.2d at 669.
[W]ith the exception of the Mass. Sup. Judicial Court's Saikewicz
opinion, which appropriated to the courts the role of making all life and
death decisions for incompetents, nearly every court confronted with
such a decision has pleaded for legislative guidance, not judicial
resolution, of these medical dilemmas.
The courts realize that frequently judicial involvement is
nothing more than a facade designed to gain approval and immunity for
the family-physician decision. When asked to make actual treatment
decisions the courts are acutely aware of their limitations and lack of
clinical experience.
John J. Paris & Frank E. Reardon, Ethics Committees in Critical Care, 2 CRITICAL CARE
CLINICS 111, 113 (1986); see also In re Terry, 573 A.2d 1235, 1251-53 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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4. Ethics Committee Adjudication'
The Board would do a periodic review and update of patient and
counselor interaction, and would sit as a quasi-judicial body' if earlier
forms of dispute resolution had not solved the problem. A recommended
composition of the Board would include a doctor, a nurse,2 s an attorney
or retired judge,' a representative of the family's religious background,
or an ecumenical pastor, and a social worker or psychologist.
Board decisions would be advisory, but intended to represent the
likely outcome if either party were to take the issue to court. All costs of
counseling, mediation, and board adjudication would be free, provided as
part of the hospital's total commitment to caring. If a party wanted legal
representation during the board hearing, that party would bear the cost.
Costs of outside legal action would also be borne by each party, with the
understanding that hospital representation or participation would not be
gratis because of the availability of numerous internal dispute resolution
mechanisms within the hospital environment.
The intrusion of this model on the overall operation of the
hospital would be minimal. Interaction of the counselor-mediator with
affected families would be subtle, informal, and private. Additional
burdens on an ethics committee would also be minimal if the committee
were functioning in more than name only. If the hospital itself were
disputing a patient's or family's treatment preference, then, following
informal mediation between the family and hospital representatives, the
dispute would be referred to another hospital's ethics committee for
mediation or board adjudication.
206. In 1983, the President's Commission stated the belief that ethics committees could
be "more rapid and sensitive than judicial review,* but also suggested that further study was
needed to ascertain the balance of advantages versus disadvantages. DECIDING TO FOREGO,
supra note 36, at 168-69.
207. Ethics committees as decision making bodies may have some advantages over both
family and the courts. They are better able to interpret medical facts and opinions, can
include community members to represent decisionmaking values known to be shared by the
patient, and their broad membership presents diverse views for consideration. Hoffmann,
Regulating Ethics, supra note 145, at 784-85.
208. The doctor would address medical prognosis issues, and the nurse treatment and
quality of care issues. Many ethics committees currently exclude the participation of nursing
or other health care professionals other than physicians, but a nurse's presence is advisable,
because "[n]urses have close contact with patients and families and may take the role of
patient advocates. They may raise previously overlooked issues, contribute new information,
or express the questions and viewpoints of patients and families.* Lo, supra note 161, at 47.
209. The attorney, retired judge, or private law judge would address legal issues and
also contribute to a balance of power away from the medical perspective.
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5. Analysis
This Comment recommends legislative action to mandate hospital
ethics committees and describe their responsibilities. Although one
commentator believes that legislation requiring the establishment of ethics
committees is not yet warranted,21' this Author contends that ethics
committees are essential to complete patient care. It may not be necessary
to strictly regulate committee structure or composition, because hospitals
and communities vary, but the existence and purpose of committees can
and should be mandated. The best way to assure compliance would be to
connect failure to comply with restrictions in federal funding. Maryland
was the first state to enact legislation requiring the creation of "patient
care advisory committees,""' and it appears to be close to recognizing
such committees as decision makers in cases involving persistent
vegetative patients.tm2
VII. CONCLUSION
Disputes and conflicts will always be inherent in decision making
for terminally ill and incompetent patients on life-support systems.
Safeguards already exist or can be crafted to protect the patient from
improperly made decisions. However, it is essential to create a
presumption in favor of the family rather than the medical or legal
communities and to provide a dispute resolution process within the hospital
to protect both patient and familial autonomy during difficult decisions.
With continuing advances in medical technology and resulting longer life
expectancies, the circumstances that render the decisions necessary occur
more and more frequently.' There were only 600,000 persons eighty-
five years old and older in the United States in 1950; by the year 2030,
210. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics, supra note 145, at 751.
211. Hollinger, supra note 155, at 742.
212. The Maryland Health Law section of the Maryland State Bar proposed that
families, after consultation with ethics committees, be permitted to remove life-sustaining
treatment from relatives in a persistent vegetative state. Under the current state law, families
of these patients must petition for a court order to remove treatment. Hoffmann, Regulating
Ethics, supra note 145, at 750, 755.
213. In 1986, one expert estimated that there were at least five to ten thousand patients
suspended in persistent vegetative states in the United States. Rhoden, supra note 11, at 424
(citing R. Cranford, Patients With Petmanent Loss of Consciousness, in BY No
EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER
186, 189 (J. Lynn ed. 1986)).
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there will be an estimated eight million.21 Without more caring forums,
and a presumption that the family is the most knowledgeable decision
maker, many more individuals will linger indefinitely' while the courts
continue to resist the greater concern and better substituted judgment of
families.'
Lynne Sims-Taylor
214. JoAN KRAUSKOPF ET AL., ELDERLAW" ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 1.7 (from
reproduction from the Draft) (West 1993).
215. It was estimated that with continued artificial nutrition and hydration Nancy
Cruzan could have "lived" another 15 to 30 years.
216. It is not only the unspoken wishes of the incompetent in a persistent vegetative
state that are at stake. Although most states today acknowledge the right of a competent
person to refuse medical treatment, the families of these individuals often face a tremendous
ordeal. In 1990, a man was refused his request to be removed from a respirator, despite his
"Do Not Resuscitate Order," affidavit, conscious declaration, agreement of his wife and
eldest son and one of his doctors. The hospital was afraid of legal liabilities and aware of the
"governmental duty to protect life." Deel v. Syracuse Veterans Admin. Medical Ctr., 729 F.
Supp. 231, 233 (N.D.N.Y 1990).
In 1988, a forty-six year-old woman was irreversibly incompetent following a
massive cerebral hemorrhage, despite a series of invasive medical procedures initiated to save
her life (brain surgery, craniotomy, gastrostomy, endotracheal tube, brain shunt). The
hospital adamantly refused to honor the family's request to discontinue life-saving treatment.
It ultimately took her family more than nineteen months to get the court to foree compliance
to an action they were positive was what their wife, mother, and daughter would have
wanted. Gray by Gray v. Roniero, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I 1988).
In 1984, despite a conscious man's opposition to using a mechanical respirator, his
doctors insisted that it remain connected as he would die otherwise; ethical concerns barred
their acceding to his contrary wishes. Barlting v. Super Ct., 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984).
The hospital put his hands in restraints to prevent him from removing the respirator, he made
a deposition stating he wanted it removed, but the trial court denied. He appealed, but died
prior to the appellate hearing - still connected to the respirator. The court of appeals
eventually reversed the trial court's opinion, but long after, Mr. Battling suffered an ignoble
death. Id.

